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THE TREACHERY OF IMAGES: REINTERPRETING
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL-SPEECH DOCTRINE
Peter Bozzo*
ABSTRACT
In 2012, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
struck down a federal rule that required tobacco companies to print
graphic images on cigarette packs.  The court found that the regulation
violated the First Amendment by forcing cigarette manufacturers to
convey the government’s anti-smoking message.  But the court’s reason-
ing suffered from two flaws.  First, the majority failed to articulate the
interpretive assumptions on which its decision rested.  When the court
described the graphic images, it implicitly adopted a particular view of
them; the majority was not acting as a neutral translator but as an active
interpreter.  Yet the court failed to recognize that it was making inter-
pretive choices, and it failed to justify those choices adequately.  Sec-
ond, when deciding which tier of scrutiny to apply, the majority relied
on an outmoded distinction between “purely factual” and “emotional”
appeals.  That distinction has no basis in the realities of peoples’ deci-
sion-making processes or in the caselaw on which the D.C. Circuit re-
lied.  To account for these two critiques—critiques that apply not just to
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion but to many compelled commercial-speech
decisions—courts should focus on the accuracy and relevance of the
information conveyed to consumers, rather than on the “purely factual”
nature of that information, when deciding compelled commercial-
speech cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2012, a new rule governing tobacco products went into effect
in Australia.1  The regulation required distributors to print textual and
graphic warnings on cigarette packs.2  One warning label cautioned
that “SMOKING CAUSES PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DIS-
* Yale Law School, J.D. 2015.  I am grateful to Tom R. Tyler and the editors of the DePaul
Law Review for their thoughtful comments on this Article.
1. Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard 2011 (Cth) s 1.5(4) (Austl.).
Although the rule took partial effect on January 1, 2012, it did not apply to “all tobacco prod-
ucts” until December 1, 2012. Id. ss 1.2, 1.5.
2. Id. ss 2.1–2.2, 3.1.
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EASE” and depicted a ghastly, gangrenous foot.3  Another label dis-
played the emaciated body of a smoker suffering from lung cancer.4
A caption revealed that the man had died at age thirty-four, while a
nearby warning statement bluntly declared, “SMOKING CAUSES
LUNG CANCER.”5  Other images portrayed an infant connected to
a ventilator (“SMOKING HARMS UNBORN BABIES”) and the
browned, rotting gums of two smokers’ mouths (“SMOKING DAM-
AGES YOUR GUMS AND TEETH”).6  The regulations provided
that the warning statements and graphic images must cover seventy-
five percent of the front surfaces of cigarette packs.7
FIGURE 1
GRAPHIC IMAGE THAT APPEARS ON SOME AUSTRALIAN
CIGARETTE PACKS8
3. Id. s 3.6(1)–(2).
4. Id. s 3.4(1)–(3).
5. Id.
6. Id. ss 3.2(1)–(2), 4.2(1)–(3).
7. Competition and Consumer (Tobacco) Information Standard 2011 (Cth) s 9.13(1) (Austl.).
The regulations provided a few exceptions to this requirement. See id. s 9.13(2).
8. This image is taken from id. s 3.6(2).
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The Australian government outlined three goals9 when it issued the
regulation in 2011.10  The objectives were to (1) “increase consumer
knowledge of [the] health effects” of tobacco use; (2) “ensure the con-
tinuing effectiveness of health warnings” on tobacco-product packag-
ing; and (3) promote “cessation” of tobacco use and “discourage
uptake or relapse.”11  But the most immediate effect of the regulation
was unexpected: Australian smokers began to report that cigarettes
tasted different.12  As Tanya Plibersek, Australia’s then-Minister for
Health, reported, “[T]he best short-term indication I have that [the
effort to decrease smoking rates and improve residents’ health is]
working is the flood of calls we had in the days after the introduction
of [the new regulations] accusing the government of changing the
taste of cigarettes.”13  Public officials and tobacco companies denied
that the cigarettes’ compositions had changed, and Plibersek posited a
psychosomatic explanation for the complaints: “It was just that people
being confronted with the ugly packaging made the psychological leap
to disgusting taste.”14  Plibersek’s intuition finds support in numerous
studies, which show that packages and labeling can influence people’s
palates.15
Although regulators might have been surprised by the images’ gus-
tatory effect, in a sense the pictures were working exactly as expected:
They were altering people’s conceptions of cigarettes and providing
smokers with new reasons to quit (or driving home old reasons with
new force).  Australia’s regulations provide just one example of a
global trend.16  As of September 2014, seventy-seven nations had im-
posed graphic-warning requirements for cigarette packages.17  The
9. Id. s 1.4.
10. The regulations are dated December 22, 2011. Id. at 1.
11. Id.
12. Matt Siegel, Law Spoils Tobacco’s Taste, Australians Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http:
//www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/global/law-spoils-tobaccos-taste-australians-say.html.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Christina A. Roberto et al., Influence of Licensed Characters on Children’s Taste
and Snack Preferences, 126 PEDIATRICS 88, 90–92 (2010) (describing an experiment in which
children tasted identical food products, some of which were contained in packages depicting
popular cartoon characters and some of which were not; finding that the subjects reported more
positive taste perceptions when the food was contained in packages with cartoon characters);
Brian Wansink et al., How Soy Labeling Influences Preference and Taste, 3 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 85, 87–91 (2000) (describing an experiment in which researchers
falsely labeled a food product to indicate that it contained soy; explaining that subjects who tried
the product with the soy label reported less favorable taste perceptions than subjects who tried
the identical product without the label).
16. See, e.g., CAN. CANCER SOC’Y, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: INTERNA-
TIONAL STATUS REPORT 2, 3 (5th ed. 2016).
17. Id. at 2.
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United States nearly joined this growing chorus in 2011, when the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a final rule that re-
quired tobacco companies to print graphic images on cigarette
packs.18  But the next year, a federal district court struck down the
regulation in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,19 and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.20
FIGURE 2.
GRAPHIC-IMAGE CIGARETTE WARNINGS PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION21
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 1141.10 (2012).
19. 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012).
20. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by
Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (holding that govern-
ment interests other than correcting deception may sustain a mandate for disclosure of purely
factual information in commercial context).
21. These images are taken from FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CIGARETTE REQUIRED
WARNINGS—ENGLISH AND SPANISH (2010), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-
2010-N-0568-0002.
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FIGURE 3.
SAMPLES OF CIGARETTE PACKAGES WITH THE FDA’S
GRAPHIC-IMAGE WARNINGS22
In striking down the FDA’s graphic-warning requirement, the D.C.
Circuit relied on a line of Supreme Court cases about compelled com-
mercial speech.23  Although “commercial speech” is notoriously diffi-
cult to define,24 a sketch of its contours will suffice for purposes of
analyzing the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning.  Compelled commercial-
speech cases generally arise when the state requires corporations to
disclose information about products or services, often in the course of
advertising.25  The foundational Supreme Court precedent in this
22. Id.
23. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1211–12, 1217–18.
24. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1285–86
(2014) (pointing out some of the difficulties and ambiguities that come with attempts to define
“commercial speech”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2000) (noting that the “boundaries” of commercial speech are “quite blurred,”
and attempting to define the term with reference to specific constitutional values rather than by
isolating a set of “unique characteristics possessed by speech acts included within the category”).
According to Corbin, “A common definition of commercial speech is that which ‘does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.’”  Corbin, supra, at 1285 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).  However, this definition has
been sharply disputed. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Whatever the precise contours of the concept
[‘commercial speech’], . . . I am persuaded that it should not include the entire range of commu-
nication that is embraced within the term ‘promotional advertising.’”).
25. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 233–34 (2010)
(addressing a federal law that required “debt relief agencies” to disclose in certain advertise-
ments that they “help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code”); Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 633 (1985) (addressing an Ohio regulation that
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field, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,26 held that com-
pelled commercial disclosures satisfy the First Amendment as long as
they “are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers.”27  In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit held that
this lenient standard of review applies only to disclosures that convey
“purely factual and uncontroversial information.”28  Because the
FDA’s grisly images did not satisfy this prerequisite,29 the court in-
voked an intermediate standard of review, far more onerous than the
Zauderer inquiry, to strike down the FDA regulation.30
In explaining why the graphic warnings did not convey “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information,” the R.J. Reynolds court noted
that “many of the images chosen by [the] FDA could be misinter-
preted by consumers.”31  If viewers misunderstood an image, they
could come away with inaccurate information—the very antithesis of
“purely factual” information.32  The D.C. Circuit also found that
“many of the images [did] not convey any warning information at
all.”33  Instead, the pictures were “primarily intended to evoke an
emotional response, or, at most, shock the viewer into retaining the
information in the text warning.”34  Because the pictures operated
largely as emotional appeals, they were not “purely factual.”35
The court’s reasoning falls prey to two critiques.  First, the majority
failed to articulate the interpretive assumptions that underpinned its
decision.  When courts classify a warning as “factual” or “emotional,”
they implicitly adopt an interpretation of that warning.  They must de-
termine what information the disclosure conveys before they can de-
cide whether the disclosure operates as a factual or emotional appeal.
The R.J. Reynolds majority implicitly undertook this task but failed to
explain or defend its understanding of the graphic images.  When the
court concluded that the pictures operated by appealing to viewers’
required attorneys to disclose—in “any advertisement that mentions contingent-fee rates”—
whether the rates are calculated before or after deducting court costs); Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (addressing a federal regulation that
required suppliers of meat products to disclose the country (or countries) where the animal was
“born, raised, and slaughtered”).
26. 471 U.S. 626.
27. Id. at 651.
28. Id.
29. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
30. Id. at 1217, 1222.
31. Id. at 1216.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17.
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emotions, it did not ground its determination in a reasoned assessment
of the information that the images conveyed.
Second, the court’s sharp distinction between “purely factual” and
“emotional” disclosures does not capture the realities of consumers’
decision-making processes because many disclosures operate as both
factual and emotional appeals.  What is more, facts and emotions fre-
quently reinforce one another; facts can trigger emotional reactions,
which, in turn, can enhance consumers’ retention of the facts con-
veyed. Logos and pathos often work together, but the D.C. Circuit’s
too-neat distinction fails to account for the interaction between the
two.
These problems are pervasive in the compelled commercial-speech
caselaw, but the R.J. Reynolds decision amplifies them because pic-
tures sit at the center of the decision.  When people view an image,
they tend to conflate the picture with the thing it depicts.36  Rene´
Magritte famously illustrated this phenomenon with his painting The
Treachery of Images, which displays a pipe sitting atop the phrase
“Ceci n’est pas une pipe” (“This is not a pipe”).37  Magritte reminds
viewers that they are not seeing a real, tangible pipe but are simply
looking at a picture of one.38  The fact that the audience needs this
reminder demonstrates, just as the artist supposed, the treachery of
images: People often assume that pictures present an unmediated vi-
sion of the world, and viewers may overlook the ways that they are
implicitly interpreting an image.39  When someone looks at Magritte’s
work and sees a pipe, she ascribes meaning to the painting.  She en-
gages in an interpretive act, even if it seems like an obvious and
straightforward one.  When confronting disclosures that contain pic-
tures, courts may also presume that they have unobstructed insight
into the images’ meanings.  Like the R.J. Reynolds majority, judges
may fail to engage critically with their understandings of the pictures
that come before them in compelled commercial-speech cases.40
Pictorial disclosures also put pressure on the R.J. Reynolds court’s
distinction between “purely factual” and “emotional” information.
Images are effective tools for “conveying meaning through associa-
tional logic, often infused with emotions that are triggered beneath
36. NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 8–10 (2009).
37. The Treachery of Images, L.A. COUNTY MUSEUM OF ART, http://collections.lacma.org/
node/239578 (last visited June 13, 2017).
38. Id.; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 689 (2012).
39. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 36, at 9–10. R
40. Id. at 8–10.
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our conscious awareness.”41  At the same time, when pictures accom-
pany textual information, they typically enhance viewers’ retention of
the material discussed in the text.42  Because images can generate
heightened emotional reactions and improve recollection of facts,
placing pictorial disclosures into one category or the other—emo-
tional or factual?—seems too reductive to capture images’ overlap-
ping effects.
The R.J. Reynolds opinion highlights the difficulties of interpreting
still images, but the problem does not stop there.  In May 2013, an
Obama Administration task force released a report on “smart disclo-
sure” techniques.43  “Smart disclosure,” the report said, “involves pro-
viding consumers with access to data in user friendly electronic
formats, in order to fuel the creation of products and tools that benefit
consumers.”44  The report refers to a U.S. Department of Education
program that used a “net price calculator tool[ ]” to “help students
understand the expected costs of college.”45  The Department of Edu-
cation encouraged people to develop videos that would “explain what
net price means” and help users “look for the net price calculator in-
formation.”46  Smart disclosure tools like the net price calculator en-
able regulators to make disclosures increasingly imminent, pressing,
and credible to viewers.  Imagine an online video that shows, in accu-
rate, painstaking detail, the decay of a smoker’s lungs or the growth of
a tumor to illustrate the risks of smoking.  The danger is that, as dis-
closures become ever more vivid and realistic, they will frequently de-
feat judges’ interpretive faculties and further blur the line between
factual and emotional information.  Courts will assume that they are
seeing reality when, in fact, they are simply seeing a picture of it.
The R.J. Reynolds opinion, coupled with the increasing use of smart
disclosure tools, demonstrates the urgency of developing a new doctri-
nal framework for compelled commercial-speech cases.  This frame-
work must provide judges with the tools to make interpretive choices,
and it must prevent courts from relying on the fuzzy, ill-advised dis-
tinction between facts and emotions.  It must recognize that images
41. Id. at 7.
42. RICHARD E. MAYER, MULTIMEDIA LEARNING 73–74 (2001) (“[S]tudents perform better
on verbal retention when they learn with text and illustrations or narration and animation than
when they learn with text alone or narration alone.”).
43. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SMART DISCLOSURE
AND CONSUMER DECISION MAKING: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SMART DISCLOSURE 7
(2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
report_of_the_task_force_on_smart_disclosure.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id.
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can manipulate consumers’ feelings, but it must also leave room for
smart disclosure regimes that incorporate pictures and videos to con-
vey accurate, helpful information to viewers.  Fortunately, crafting
such a framework does not require a great deal of innovation.  It sim-
ply requires a return to Zauderer’s roots.
Zauderer explicitly defines the value of commercial speech: “[T]he
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is jus-
tified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides.”47  Placing consumers at the center of the doctrinal
analysis suggests that courts should undertake a four-part inquiry to
assess the constitutionality of compelled commercial disclosures.
First, judges should determine whether the regulation at issue is a
“disclosure requirement[ ]” or an “outright prohibition[ ] on
speech.”48  If the regulation prohibits corporations from speaking,
then intermediate scrutiny applies;49 if the regulation requires corpo-
rations to speak, then Zauderer review applies.50  If the disclosure is
subject to Zauderer scrutiny, the court should move on to articulate,
as precisely as possible, what information the disclosure conveys (Step
Two).  This step will require courts to acknowledge that they are en-
gaged in an interpretive act, and judges should expressly justify their
proposed interpretations with references to specific textual or graphic
elements of the disclosure.  After determining what information a dis-
closure conveys, courts should assess whether the information is accu-
rate (Step Three).  Finally, judges should ask whether the information
is relevant to consumers (Step Four).  Accurate disclosures convey
truthful, nonmisleading information, and relevant disclosures contain
information that will influence the typical consumer’s purchasing deci-
sions.  Disclosures that reveal accurate and relevant information
should survive First Amendment scrutiny under Zauderer.
When undertaking this four-step inquiry, courts should rely on any
available (valid) data that sheds light on the key doctrinal questions.
Courts might have access to survey data compiled by administrative
agencies that illustrate how consumers will interpret or understand an
image, and judges should invoke these data to justify interpretations
of challenged disclosures.  In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit might
have relied on evidence about how people’s attitudes changed after
exposure to the graphic images—evidence that was readily available
47. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
48. Id. at 650.
49. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980).
50. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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in the administrative record.51  Similarly, when deciding whether in-
formation in a disclosure is relevant to consumers, judges should refer
to available information that addresses the facts that consumers would
like to know in deciding whether to purchase a product.  Once courts
signal their willingness to rely on surveys and other data in performing
the doctrinal analysis, agencies will have powerful incentives to collect
the necessary information, which will in turn provide courts with a
robust foundation on which to base their judgments.  The goal of this
data-driven approach is to discipline courts’ interpretive choices—to
ensure that judges look at disclosures from the perspective of the typi-
cal consumer, not just the typical judge.
This doctrinal proposal differs from those offered by other scholars,
in part because I articulate the nature of the problems with compelled
commercial-speech doctrine differently from these theorists.  Caroline
Mala Corbin, Ellen P. Goodman, and Rebecca Tushnet have all ar-
gued that the doctrinal difficulties in compelled commercial-speech
cases stem from courts’ fallacious distinction between reason (or fact)
and emotion.52  But the trouble runs deeper.  The problem is not sim-
ply that courts have developed an incoherent scheme for classifying
disclosures; the problem is that judges have failed to recognize the
interpretive act that necessarily precedes classification.  Focusing on
this act brings attention to a crucial doctrinal move that typically oc-
curs beneath the surface—and that has given rise to many of the diffi-
culties in compelled commercial-speech cases.
Because I articulate the flaws with the current doctrine differently
from Corbin, Goodman, and Tushnet, my proposed solutions aim in a
different direction as well.  Corbin suggests that courts ask four ques-
tions in assessing the constitutionality of mandated disclosures:
1. Does the compelled disclosure risk chilling speech?
51. 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012); JAMES NONNEMAKER ET AL., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPERI-
MENTAL STUDY OF GRAPHIC CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS: FINAL RESULTS REPORT 3-1 to 3-
37 (2010), http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/USA-2010-Experimental
-Study-of-Graphic-Cigarette-Warning-Labels-Final-Results-Report-and-Appendices-FDA.pdf.
52. Corbin, supra note 24, at 1321 (“Compelled speech may manipulate audiences if it is false R
or misleading, or if it intentionally exploits decision-making heuristics.  Notably, this does not
mean that all emotional appeals are problematic, as not all emotional speech exploits cognitive
errors.”); Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional
Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 559 (2014) (“When it comes to the
cigarette labels and other forms of graphic disclosure, the right question is not whether the
speaker intentionally activates emotional responses but whether the speaker intentionally uses
emotions to distort or bypass rational choice.”); Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion
and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV 2392, 2422 (2014) (“The reality that emotions are
inextricably intertwined with reason means that many of the conventional arguments for distin-
guishing legitimate and illegitimate government interventions into the marketplace for speech
misdescribe the world, and therefore don’t work.”).
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2. Does the compelled disclosure distort the discourse in some
way?
3. Does the compelled disclosure infringe on the autonomy of the
speaker?
4. Does the compelled disclosure infringe on the autonomy of the
audience?53
According to Corbin, in evaluating a disclosure’s impact on audience
autonomy, courts should ask “not whether the compelled speech ap-
peals to emotion, but whether the persuasive impact is due to the mer-
its of the argument or to the intentional exploitation of a cognitive
shortcut.”54  In Corbin’s view, only disclosures that rely on “cognitive
shortcut[s]” raise First Amendment concerns.55  Similarly, Goodman
cautions, “When it comes to cigarette labels and other forms of
graphic disclosure, the right question is not whether the speaker inten-
tionally activates emotional responses but whether the speaker inten-
tionally uses emotions to distort or bypass rational choice.”56  To
protect consumers from manipulation, courts “should be skeptical of
disclosures that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a con-
troversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm.”57
Corbin and Goodman’s proposals are similar in that they seek to
replace the fact/emotion distinction with an allegedly superior classifi-
cation scheme.  For Corbin, the relevant distinction is between disclo-
sures that exploit cognitive heuristics and those that do not;58 for
Goodman, it is between controversial and noncontroversial disclo-
sures.59  The categories that Corbin and Goodman develop, however,
are no more determinate than the distinction between reason and
emotion that the authors condemn.  Consider Corbin’s description of
the FDA’s graphic disclosures.  On the one hand, the images might
“make[ ] it more likely that the viewer will actually read and think
about the government’s message.”60  If the images have this effect,
according to Corbin, they do not “seem[ ] to undercut the decision-
making autonomy of the viewer.”61  On the other hand, the images
might reflect the government’s attempt to “link[ ] smoking with some-
thing that triggers a negative emotional response, hoping that negative
53. Corbin, supra note 24, at 1308. R
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Goodman, supra note 52, at 559. R
57. Id. at 550.
58. Corbin, supra note 24, at 1308. R
59. Goodman, supra note 52, at 550. R
60. Corbin, supra note 24, at 1322. R
61. Id. at 1322–23.
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emotion will then be transferred to smoking itself.”62  If the images
have this effect, Corbin claims, they rely on an illegitimate cognitive
heuristic and disclosures that incorporate them violate the First
Amendment.63  The problem with Corbin’s analysis is that the images’
effects cannot be disentangled quite so easily.  The pictures operate
both by making the text warnings more salient and by ensuring that
viewers associate cigarettes with negative emotions.  Each effect rein-
forces the other; viewers’ negative reactions to the images increase the
text warnings’ salience, and the text’s increased salience intensifies
viewers’ concerns about the risks of smoking.  To distinguish between
the two effects—between the images’ impact on rational thought and
their exploitation of cognitive heuristics—is to misunderstand how
people think.
Goodman’s proposal, which focuses on the “controversialness” of
disclosures, suffers from a similar indeterminacy.64  As Goodman can-
didly acknowledges, “A usable definition of ‘controversial’ would
have to be worked out, as courts have worked out other standards
based on assessments of social consensus.  Undoubtedly, it would
have to include a substantiality component that controlled for outlying
opinions, as even a proposition such as ‘smoking kills’ has its detrac-
tors.”65  As this concession reveals, Goodman’s test remains fuzzy,
and its application to the FDA’s graphic images demonstrates the am-
biguity.  On one view, the pictures are not controversial because they
simply illustrate the text warnings, which themselves disclose (largely)
undisputed facts about smoking (“Cigarettes are addictive,” “Tobacco
smoke can harm your children”).66  From another perspective, the
images controversially manipulate consumers’ emotions and attempt
to shame smokers into quitting.67  But Goodman does not provide
courts with guidance in choosing between these two conceptions.  A
judge must understand how the images work before she can deter-
mine whether they are controversial, and Goodman does not advance
a sufficiently robust theory of interpretation to help courts reach this
understanding.
62. Id. at 1323.
63. Id.
64. Goodman, supra note 52, at 531. R
65. Id. at 554.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2012).
67. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“These
inflammatory images and the provocatively-named hotline . . . are unabashed attempts to evoke
emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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Tushnet has sought doctrinal clarity by abandoning classification
schemes altogether.  In her view, “factual misleadingness” should be
the touchstone of compelled commercial-speech doctrine: “Because
emotion and reason are inextricable, emotional appeals should be fair
game for the government as well as for private parties, unless the
emotion is tied to factual deception.”68  But Tushnet’s hands-off test
requires a departure from current compelled commercial-speech doc-
trine. Zauderer counsels that compelled disclosures serve a useful
purpose to the extent that they provide consumers with accurate, rele-
vant information.69  Tushnet maintains a focus on informational accu-
racy, but she ignores the importance of the information’s relevance to
consumers and betrays Zauderer’s reasoning in the process.  While
Tushnet rightly focuses on the overlap between reason and emotion,
she jumps too quickly from her belief in the incoherence of the fact/
emotion dichotomy to the conclusion that courts should back away
from aggressively monitoring the government’s disclosure regimes.
The appropriate response is to develop a doctrinal test that maps the
realities of people’s decision-making processes, not to give up the
game entirely.
Returning to Zauderer’s foundations offers a way around the doctri-
nal dilemmas that Corbin, Goodman, and Tushnet have identified—
and that their proposals would amplify.  This backward-looking re-
form does not require, a` la Tushnet, that courts abandon Zauderer’s
doctrinal formulations or passively permit the government to move
ahead with all non-deceptive emotional appeals.  Nor does this reform
give up on the fact/emotion dichotomy only to develop equally
opaque classification schemes centered on cognitive heuristics or
“controversialness.”  My proposal is, in some senses, less ambitious
than other scholars’ alternatives because it seeks simply to reinvigo-
rate a precedent that, while remaining on the books, has been ignored
for too long.  But in an area where the caselaw has become so mud-
dled—and strayed so far from Zauderer—a return to the doctrine’s
roots may represent the most radical departure of all.  Looking back-
ward, at least in the field of compelled commercial-speech doctrine,
reveals a clear path ahead.
68. Tushnet, supra note 52, at 2425. R
69. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to con-
sumers of the information such speech provides.”).
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II. GRAPHIC DISCLOSURES AND R.J. REYNOLDS
On June 22, 2009, Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act.70  The Act listed nine statements, such as
“[c]igarettes are addictive” and “[t]obacco smoke can harm your chil-
dren,” and provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to man-
ufacture, package, sell, offer to sell, distribute, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of
which fail[ed] to bear” one of the nine warnings.71  The statute also
directed the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to “issue regulations that require[d] color graphics depicting
the negative health consequences of smoking.”72  Relying on this au-
thority, the FDA promulgated a proposed rule on November 12,
2010,73 and a final rule on June 22, 2011.74  The regulation required all
cigarette packages to display one of the nine textual warnings, an ac-
companying graphic image, and the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” hotline
number.75  The text, image, and phone number were to cover at least
half of each of the front and back surfaces of cigarette packs.76  Simi-
lar text warnings and graphic images were to occupy at least twenty
percent of the space in cigarette advertisements.77  Within two months
of the final rule’s issuance,78 five tobacco companies sued the FDA.79
The corporations challenged the graphic-warning regulations on both
First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
grounds.80  After granting a preliminary injunction,81 the District
Court for the District of Columbia struck down the graphic-image re-
70. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2012).
72. Id. § 1333(d).
73. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524 (pro-
posed Nov. 12, 2010) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)).
74. 21 C.F.R. § 1141.
75. Id. §§ 1141.10(a), 1141.16; see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208–09
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the statutory scheme and the FDA’s final rule), overruled in part by
Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
76. 21 C.F.R. § 1141.10(a)(4).
77. Id. § 1141.10(b)(1), (5).
78. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C. 2012).
79. Id. at 268.
80. Id. at 268 & n.3.  Neither the district court nor the circuit court reached the APA question
because both disposed of the case on First Amendment grounds. See id.; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco,
696 F.3d at 1208 n.1.
81. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 53 (D.D.C. 2011).
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quirement as a violation of the First Amendment,82 and the FDA
appealed.83
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit first addressed the applicable tier of
scrutiny.84  Courts generally review commercial-speech laws or regula-
tions under the intermediate-scrutiny standard outlined by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission.85  That case delineated a four-part inquiry
for evaluating commercial-speech regulations.86  First, the court must
ask whether the speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.87
Speech that falls into either of these categories receives no First
Amendment protection.88  For other speech, courts move on to the
second stage to assess “whether the asserted governmental interest” in
compelling speech “is substantial.”89  The court then inquires
“whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted,”90 and the final step requires judges to ensure that the regu-
lation “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that inter-
est.”91  If the regulation satisfies this four-part test, then it survives
First Amendment review.92
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the Central Hudson inquiry.93 Zauderer
addressed a number of Ohio state rules that regulated attorney con-
duct.94  One such regulation “provide[d] that any advertisement that
mentions contingent-fee rates must ‘disclos[e] whether percentages
82. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
83. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1211.
84. Id.
85. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
92. Id.
93. 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985).  The relationship between Central Hudson and Zauderer is
contested.  In American Meat Institute v. Department of Agriculture, the en banc D.C. Circuit
tentatively suggested that Zauderer could be read as an application of Central Hudson’s interme-
diate-scrutiny standard, rather than as an exception to that standard.  760 F.3d 18, 26–27 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc).  In a concurrence, Judge Rogers sharply disputed this characterization of
Zauderer. See id. at 28 (Rogers, J., concurring in part) (“Viewing Zauderer as simply an applica-
tion of Central Hudson to special circumstances . . . finds support in neither Supreme Court
precedent nor the precedent of this court or our sister circuits.”).  While this doctrinal debate
does not directly influence my analysis, my understanding of Zauderer, reflected in some of the
language used in this Article, comports with Judge Rogers’s view.  I see Zauderer as carving out
an exception to the Central Hudson standard rather than as applying that standard.
94. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630–34.
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are computed before or after deduction of court costs and ex-
penses.’”95  When Philip Q. Zauderer was charged with violating the
rule, he challenged it on First Amendment grounds.96  In assessing his
claim, the Supreme Court distinguished between “disclosure require-
ments” and “outright prohibitions on speech.”97  It noted that, in
some cases, “compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First
Amendment as prohibitions on speech.”98  The case at hand, however,
presented a distinct set of facts:
Ohio has not attempted to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”  The State has
attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial
advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncon-
troversial information about the terms under which his services will
be available.99
The Court concluded that, in the commercial-speech context, disclo-
sure requirements are subject to less strict scrutiny than outright
prohibitions: “Because the extension of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information
in his advertising is minimal.”100  As a result, Central Hudson’s four-
part test did not apply when the government mandated commercial
speech.101  Instead, disclosure requirements were constitutional as
long as they were “reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.”102  The contingent-fee disclosure
requirement “easily passe[d] muster” because it was reasonably re-
lated to the government’s desire to eliminate client confusion about
legal costs.103
In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit offered two rationales in conclud-
ing that Zauderer’s lenient standard of review did not apply to the
95. Id. at 633 (second alteration in original) (quoting OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR
2-101(B)(15) (1985), superseded by OHIO CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR 2-101(E)(1)(c)
(2007)).
96. Id. at 634.
97. Id. at 650.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 651 (citation omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
100. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 652.
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FDA’s graphic-image regulation.104  First, the court found that
Zauderer comes into play only when a disclosure seeks to prevent con-
sumer deception.105  Because the graphic images did not attempt to
achieve this goal—but rather sought to “discourage consumers from
buying” cigarettes—Zauderer was inapplicable.106  Second, the court
stated that Zauderer applies only when a disclosure conveys “‘purely
factual and uncontroversial’ information”—a condition that, accord-
ing to the court, the graphic images did not satisfy.107
In explaining why the graphic images did not qualify as “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial,” the court again provided two reasons.108
First, “many of the images chosen by [the] FDA could be misinter-
preted by consumers”—an observation that, in the court’s view,
meant that the images could not qualify as “purely factual.”109  Sec-
ond, the court said that the graphic warnings were “primarily intended
to evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock the viewer into
retaining the information in the text warning.”110  In the court’s view,
the pictures manipulatively attempted to scare viewers into quitting,
rather than seeking to persuade rationally with facts.111  As a result,
the court applied Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny and
struck down the regulation.112
III. A TWOFOLD CRITIQUE
The R.J. Reynolds opinion suffers from two flaws.  First, the court
failed to justify its interpretations of the FDA’s graphic images and
the information that they conveyed.  Second, the majority’s distinction
between “purely factual” and “emotional” disclosures  does not re-
flect the ways that consumers actually process information.  While
many compelled commercial-speech decisions suffer from the same
problems, these difficulties are particularly acute in the R.J. Reynolds
opinion because the case addresses pictorial disclosures.
104. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
105. Id. at 1213–14.
106. Id. at 1216.
107. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
108. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1216–17.
112. Id. at 1217, 1222.
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A. The Necessity of Interpretation
In assessing whether a disclosure is “purely factual and uncon-
troversial” under Zauderer, courts implicitly undertake a two-step
process (although judges may not always acknowledge, or even recog-
nize, that they are doing so).  First, the court determines what infor-
mation the challenged disclosure conveys.  Second, the judge assesses
whether this information qualifies as “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial.”  The R.J. Reynolds court engaged in just this sort of analysis
when explaining why the FDA’s graphic images were not “purely
factual”:
[M]any of the images do not convey any warning information at all,
much less make an “accurate statement” about cigarettes.  For ex-
ample, the images of a woman crying, a small child, and the man
wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with the words “I QUIT” do not offer
any information about the health effects of smoking. . . . These in-
flammatory images . . . cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts
to convey information to consumers.  They are unabashed attempts
to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat con-
sumers into quitting.113
The court’s reasoning embodies the implicit Zauderer two-step.  Next,
the majority advances an argument about the facts (or lack thereof)
that the images convey, albeit without acknowledging that it is making
an interpretive claim.114  Then, the court determines that, because
many of the pictures do not offer “any warning information at all,”
they cannot qualify as “purely factual” under Zauderer.115
The court’s opinion reflects one possible interpretation of the
FDA’s graphic images, but not the only conceivable one.  Some view-
ers might find that the picture of the crying woman enunciates ciga-
rettes’ harmfulness or dramatizes the grief that might accompany the
loss of a loved one from a smoking-induced illness.116  Similarly, one
might believe that the image of a small child illustrates the effects of
involuntary tobacco inhalation because the picture depicts a baby gaz-
ing at an ominous billow of smoke.117  Indeed, the R.J. Reynolds dis-
113. Id. at 1216.
114. Id.
115. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17.
116. See Tushnet, supra note 52, at 2411–12 (noting that the image of the tearful woman might R
convey that “nonsmokers who contract fatal lung disease will be mourned” or that “smokers
who discover that an intimate has fatal lung disease will feel guilt”).
117. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 696 F.3d at 1232 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Regarding the
[image of the small child], commentators noted that it would ‘clearly inform parents that when
they smoke in the presence of their children, their children will also be inhaling toxins.’” (quot-
ing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,650
(codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)))).
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senter advanced precisely these interpretations: “Addressing potential
purchasers of cigarettes, these two warning labels convey the message
that smoking poses risks not only to them, but also to their family
members and others.”118  While a viewer might look at the graphic
images and emerge with no new information, that outcome is not in-
evitable—a point that the R.J. Reynolds majority ignored when it as-
sumed that the images could be interpreted in only one way.
Despite the contestability of its interpretive choices, the R.J. Reyn-
olds court did not attempt to justify its proposed understandings of the
images.  The majority did not explain why its interpretations of the
pictures were better than any alternative understandings, and the
court did not respond to the dissenter’s view that the images did con-
vey valuable information.  Consider the court’s interpretation of an-
other of the FDA’s graphic images:
[T]he image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole might be
misinterpreted as suggesting that such a procedure is a common
consequence of smoking—a more logical interpretation than [the]
FDA’s contention that it symbolizes “the addictive nature of ciga-
rettes,” which requires significant extrapolation on the part of the
consumers.119
Once again, the court adopts a particular understanding of the im-
age—one view is “more logical” than another—without pointing to
specific aspects of the picture that support the allegedly superior inter-
pretation.  And once again, the dissenter disputed the majority’s
characterization:
The image accompanying the textual warning “Cigarettes are addic-
tive” depicts a man smoking through a tracheotomy opening in his
throat.  Viewed with the accompanying text, this image conveys the
tenacity of nicotine addiction: even after . . . undergoing surgery for
cancer, one might be unable to abstain from smoking.120
The majority treated the images as if they were “transparent”—as if
their meanings were not open to legitimate debate121—even as the
dissent vigorously debated the very interpretations adopted by the
court.
The R.J. Reynolds court is not the only one to assume the validity of
its interpretive choices in compelled commercial-speech cases.  In Na-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1216 (majority opinion) (quoting Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,649).
120. Id. at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
121. See Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words, supra note 38, at 687 (“When courts treat images
as transparent, they deny that interpretation is necessary, claiming that images merely replicate
reality, so that the meaning of an image is so obvious that it admits of no serious debate.”).
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tional Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC,122 the D.C. Circuit addressed a
First Amendment challenge to a federal statute and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation that implemented that stat-
ute.123  Enacted in 2010, the law addressed “conflict minerals,” which
were defined as “(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold,
wolframite, or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its deriva-
tives determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] or an adjoining coun-
try.”124  In regulations implementing the statute, the SEC required
specified entities to indicate whether their products were “DRC con-
flict free”—in other words, whether the products contained any con-
flict minerals that had originated in the DRC or neighboring
nations.125  The D.C. Circuit struck down the regulation, as well as the
relevant statutory provision, on First Amendment grounds.126  Al-
though the court’s holding did not primarily rest on Zauderer’s
“purely factual and uncontroversial” language,127 the majority sug-
gested that the conflict-minerals rule was neither “purely factual” nor
“uncontroversial”:
[T]he description at issue—whether a product is “conflict free” or
“not conflict free”—[is] hardly “factual and non-ideological.” . . .
“Products and minerals do not fight conflicts.  The label ‘[not] con-
flict free’ is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the
Congo war.  It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its products
are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed
groups.  An issuer, including an issuer who condemns the atrocities
of the Congo war in the strongest terms, may disagree with that
assessment of its moral responsibility.  And it may convey that ‘mes-
sage’ through ‘silence.’  By compelling an issuer to confess blood on
its hands, the statute interferes with that exercise of the freedom of
speech under the First Amendment.”128
122. 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
123. Id. at 363–65.  Although the D.C. Circuit issued its initial opinion in April 2014, it later
granted panel rehearing. See Order Granting Petition for Panel Rehearing, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014).  Following rehearing, the court reaffirmed its initial judg-
ment.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  The court “assume[d]
familiarity” with its original opinion and did not reiterate the facts of the case, id. at 519, so I
refer to the first opinion when discussing factual matters.  I will refer to the opinion issued after
panel rehearing when discussing the court’s legal reasoning.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(4) (2012); Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,275 n.6 (Sept. 12,
2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2012)).
125. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,364.
126. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 521; see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 370–73.
127. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 521–27.
128. Id. at 530 (third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,
748 F.3d at 371).
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In this passage, the D.C. Circuit makes a number of contestable inter-
pretive choices without sufficiently defending those choices.  While a
viewer might read the “conflict free” disclosure as a confession of
moral culpability, that understanding is not inevitable.129  Consumers
might instead regard the disclosure as a factual statement about the
origins of certain minerals without attributing blame to issuers that
use those minerals.130  The majority did not explain why the disclosure
was better understood as an admission of guilt than as a statement of
fact, and, as in R.J. Reynolds, the dissenter forcefully disputed the ma-
jority’s characterizations.131
In CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. San Francisco,132 the Ninth Circuit
similarly failed to grapple with its interpretive assumptions.  The court
confronted a San Francisco ordinance that sought to inform consum-
ers about the “potential for adverse health effects from long-term cell
phone use, particularly for children.”133  The law required the San
Francisco Department of the Environment to draft an “informational
factsheet,” which—along with an “informational poster” and “set of
statements”—would “inform consumers of issues pertaining to radi-
ofrequency energy emissions from cell phones and actions that can be
taken by cell phone users to minimize exposure to radiofrequency en-
ergy.”134  The ordinance also required retailers to distribute the fact-
sheet to all cell phone purchasers (and to anyone else who requested
it).135  When an association representing the telecommunications in-
129. See id. at 539–40 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (noting that issuers may explain the meaning
of “DRC conflict free” in their disclosures, and stating that such explanations “do[ ] not ‘re-
quire[ ] an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted,’ much less ‘to confess
blood on its hands.’  [They] instead communicate[ ] a statement of fact about the geographic
source of the minerals in its products—i.e., that the issuer could not determine with certainty
whether component minerals directly or indirectly finance armed groups in the DRC region,
thus obligating the issuer to describe the products as having ‘not been found to be DRC conflict
free.’” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 530 (majority opinion))).
130. See id. at 538–39 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“The term ‘DRC conflict free’ is a term of
art defined in the Rule and statute: a product is ‘DRC conflict free’ if it contains no ‘conflict
minerals’ originating in the DRC or adjoining countries that finance armed groups in those
countries.  The question whether a product has been ‘found to be DRC conflict free’ thus calls
for a ‘factual’ response: the product either has, or has not, been ‘found to be DRC conflict free’
under the statutory definition.  There is nothing non-factual about the required disclosure, nor is
the factual accuracy of the disclosure subject to dispute.” (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii), (D) (2012); 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,321 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2016)))).
131. Id. at 538–39.
132. 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
133. S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE 156-11, § 1 (2011).
134. Id. § 1104(a)–(b).
135. Id. § 1103(b).
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dustry136 challenged the law on First Amendment grounds,137 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the factsheet was not “purely factual and
uncontroversial”:
[T]he . . . fact sheet contains more than just facts.  It also contains
San Francisco’s recommendations as to what consumers should do if
they want to reduce exposure to radiofrequency energy emissions.
This language could prove to be interpreted by consumers as ex-
pressing San Francisco’s opinion that using cell phones is
dangerous.138
Notice the equivocal nature of the opinion’s language.  The court is
implicitly advancing an interpretation of the factsheet but cannot
bring itself to admit that it is engaged in an interpretive act.  Instead, it
passively notes that the document “could prove to be interpreted by
consumers” in a particular way.139  The court does not explain why
this interpretation is a likely (or even plausible) one.  Some viewers
might think that the factsheet provides worried consumers with infor-
mation about cell-phone use without endorsing those consumers’ con-
cerns.  The court implies that it is just proposing one possible
interpretation of the disclosure, but the opinion’s halfhearted lan-
guage conceals what is actually going on: The court is actively adopt-
ing that interpretation, which provides the basis for striking down the
ordinance.
136. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 9, CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v.
San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. cv-10-3224-LB), 2010 WL 2917618, at
*1 (“CTIA represents all sectors of the wireless industry . . . .”).
137. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
138. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. San Francisco, 494 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012).
139. Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
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FIGURE 5
INFORMATIONAL FACTSHEET DEVELOPED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT140
140. This image is used with the permission of the San Francisco Office of City Attorney
General. See You Can Limit Exposure to Radio-Frequency (RF) Energy from Your Cell Phone,
CITY & CTY. S.F., https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Citys-fact-
sheet.pdf (last visited June 13, 2017).
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In Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,141 the Seventh Cir-
cuit analyzed an Illinois law that required video game retailers “to
place a sign in their stores explaining the video game rating system
and to produce consumers with brochures about the . . . system.”142  In
striking down this portion of the statute, the court engaged in
“[c]areful consideration of what the signs and brochures are in fact
communicating.”143  Such consideration revealed that
the message is neither purely factual nor uncontroversial.  The signs
and the brochures are intended to communicate that any video
games in the store can be properly judged pursuant to the standards
described in the [Entertainment Software Ratings Board] ratings.
Moreover, the signs communicate endorsement of ESRB, a non-
governmental third party whose message may be in conflict with
that of any particular retailer.144
While a viewer could conceivably think that the signs and brochures
amount to a ratification of the ESRB system, a consumer might in-
stead regard the postings as “purely factual” statements about how to
interpret the ESRB’s ratings.  When it determined that the signs and
brochures “communicate[d] endorsement,” the Seventh Circuit took
an interpretive leap, but the court did not point to specific aspects of
the disclosure to justify that leap.
In each of these instances, courts engaged in an interpretive act to
determine whether a disclosure was “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial.”145  In none of these cases, however, was the proposed interpreta-
tion self-evident.  Each disclosure could have been understood in
more than one way, and the court adopted one of the possible under-
standings in determining whether Zauderer applied.  Yet judges were
loath to acknowledge the contestability of their interpretive choices.
In some cases, courts simply asserted that one interpretation was more
reasonable than another without explaining why.  In other instances,
courts claimed that consumers might understand the disclosure to con-
vey misleading information without clarifying why deception was
likely.  These cases reveal that, when courts apply Zauderer’s “purely
factual and uncontroversial” language, they frequently advance con-
testable interpretations without offering sufficient justification for piv-
otal interpretive choices.
141. 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
142. Id. at 643.
143. Id. at 652.
144. Id. at 652–53 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)).
145. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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If courts struggle to defend their interpretive assumptions in run-of-
the-mill compelled commercial-speech cases, the problem only inten-
sifies when pictorial disclosures (like the FDA’s graphic images) come
into play.  As Neal Feigenson and Christina Spiesel have highlighted,
certain pictures are “descriptive” in the sense that they depict “what
we might see with our eyes looking out on the world” (as opposed to
abstract images that do not provide documentary depiction of what
the world looks like).146  People tend to view descriptive images as
depictions of “unmediated reality”—as illustrations that do not re-
quire interpretation but that convey highly accurate representations of
the portrayed object.147  Feigenson and Spiesel refer to this tendency
as “naı¨ve realism,” which encompasses two related beliefs.148  First,
naı¨ve realism rests on “the common-sense notion that there’s an ob-
jective world out there and that anyone with open eyes can know it
and see it.”149  Second, naı¨ve realism draws on people’s propensity “to
conflate representations with direct perceptions of reality, to ‘look
through’ the mediation at what is depicted.”150  Because vision is “the
primary sense through which we experience the world outside our-
selves,” people typically treat visual stimuli as if they were particularly
trustworthy151 while casting a wary eye on texts.152
The inclination to trust images has a basis in cognitive neuroscience.
The portions of the brain that register “sensory inputs,” such as the
inputs that come from viewing images, are located far from the frontal
lobe, which processes “the kinds of language-mediated thoughts that
lead to reflection, critique, and suspicion.”153  The distance between
these areas of the brain may lead viewers to accept intuitively the
truth of pictures instead of taking a step back to criticize or reevaluate
the images.154  As Randall Bezanson puts the point,
[T]he sensory and emotional and often visual or re-representational
nature of art makes it more powerful and less susceptible to the
cooling impact of cognitive expression and reason.  It is an entirely
146. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 36, at 6. R
147. Id. at 8 (“Pictures that are descriptive . . . [are] more likely to provoke cognitive and
especially emotional responses similar to those aroused by the real thing depicted.”).
148. Id. at 8–9.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 9–10.
152. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 36,  at 8 (“Pictures tend to be more vivid than words R
and, especially in the case of the rapid picture sequences in video and film, they can be more
involving and entertaining, decreasing the mental resources available for doubt.”).
153. Id. at 9.
154. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 252 (2009).
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different experience to read about a burning cross than to witness it
firsthand or to see its image on film or canvas.155
Images have power over the viewer in a way that words—cool, reflec-
tive, rational—do not.
This analysis of image processing suggests that pictorial disclosures
may exacerbate the difficulties that plague compelled commercial-
speech doctrine.  When assessing images, judges may fail to subject
their interpretive instincts to the kind of critical reflection that textual
disclosures trigger.156  Even worse, judges may fail to recognize that
they are engaged in an interpretive act at all.157  They may assume
that they have unmediated access to a picture’s meaning, and they
may think that they have no obligation to justify their understanding
of the image.  Because pictorial disclosures inhibit judges’ ability to
articulate interpretive choices, these disclosures amplify a problem
that underlies much of compelled commercial-speech doctrine.
B. The Incoherence of the Fact/Emotion Dichotomy
The R.J. Reynolds court also found that the FDA’s graphic images
were not “purely factual” because they operated primarily by appeal-
ing to viewers’ emotions.158  The court’s distinction between “factual”
and “emotional” disclosures does not hold up because this dichotomy
fails to account for the ways that people actually process information.
At the risk of stating the obvious, disclosures can both convey facts
and incite emotion.  When designing the graphic images, the FDA
sought to achieve both objectives.  Before issuing its final rule, the
agency conducted a study to assess how consumers would respond to
the graphic cigarette warnings.159  The researchers concluded that
many of the selected pictures would trigger negative feelings in con-
sumers, but the images would simultaneously improve viewers’ knowl-
edge of the health risks of smoking.160  Consider, as an analogy, the
155. Id.
156. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 36, at 9. R
157. Id.
158. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
159. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,637 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)); NONNEMAKER ET AL., supra note 51, R
at 1-2 to 1-3.
160. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,649–57 (explaining the emotional and cognitive impact of each of the selected images); see
Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Regulation,
169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53, 62–63 (2013) (noting that the FDA’s questions
on subjects’ emotional responses “tended to produce fairly dramatic results”); see also NON-
NEMAKER ET AL., supra note 51, at 4-1 (“Most of the warning images elicited strong emotional R
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nutrition facts on the sides of food products.  These seemingly neutral
labels convey information about the food (number of calories, percent
of daily vitamins, protein content).  But the labels, while “purely fac-
tual,” may still have emotional effects, as anyone who has felt disap-
pointment or anger upon discovering the unhealthy content of a
favorite food can attest.  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s contrast be-
tween fact- and emotion-driven decision making overlooks the ways
that both facts and emotions contribute to sound judgment.  People
tend to recall events with particular clarity when those events are as-
sociated with strong emotions.161  When it promulgated the graphic
images, the FDA made precisely this point: “[E]liciting strong emo-
tional and cognitive reactions to graphic warnings enhances recall and
information processing, which helps to ensure that the warning[s are]
better . . . understood[ ] and remembered.”162  Rather than attempting
to overwhelm the facts conveyed by the text warnings, the FDA
sought to cement viewers’ memories of those facts.163
The boundary between fact and emotion becomes murky when pic-
torial disclosures come into play because images are often more emo-
tionally charged than words.164  In a 2005 study, Emily A. Holmes and
Andrew Mathews asked subjects to listen to recordings that described
potentially anxiety-inducing situations.165  One recording intoned,
“You are at work when you hear the fire alarms go off. You run to the
exit when you discover that it is for real.”166  Some subjects heard
about shark attacks: “You have gone to Australia.  You are swimming
in the sea and see a fin snaking toward you and realize it is a shark.”167
and cognitive responses compared with controls.”); Jolls, supra, at 67 (noting that the graphic
images also “tend[ed] to reduce individuals’ factual misperceptions relative to these warnings’
text-only counterparts”).
161. See, e.g., Adam K. Anderson et al., Emotion Enhances Remembrance of Neutral Events
Past, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1599, 1601 (2006) (“The present studies demonstrated that on
an event-by-event basis increased intensity of an emotional experience enhanced memory for
prior neutral events . . . .”); Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Negative Emotion Enhances Memory Accu-
racy: Behavioral and Neuroimaging Evidence, 16 ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. 213, 213–14 (2007)
(“[A]lthough emotional experiences are not remembered with picture-perfect accuracy, emotion
can enhance memory for many details, including the color of the font in which a word was
presented, the spatial location of a word on a computer screen, or whether information was
visually presented or mentally imagined.” (citations omitted)).
162. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
36,640–41.
163. Id.
164. Elinor Amit, Visual Versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition, in
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES OF THE SOCIAL MIND 340, 345 (Jeffrey W. Sherman et al. eds., 2014).
165. See Emily Holmes & Andrew Mathews, Mental Imagery and Emotion: A Special Rela-
tionship?, 5 EMOTION 489 (2005).
166. Id. at 490.
167. Id.
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The researchers asked one group of subjects to “imagin[e] the event”
(the “imagery condition”) and told another group to “think about the
meaning of the verbal text without using imagery” (the “verbal-se-
mantic condition”).168  The researchers found that “[p]articipants in
the imagery condition reported greater increases in . . . anxiety than
those in the verbal-semantic condition.”169  Translating a situation into
images triggered more intense emotional reactions than translating
the same situation into words.
Similarly, in a 1994 study, Jan De Houwer and Dick Hermans ex-
posed subjects to various combinations of pictures and words.170  The
researchers asked some participants whether the pictures had a posi-
tive or negative connotation (the “Picture-condition”) and asked
other participants whether the words had a positive or negative con-
notation (the “Word-condition”).171  In some cases, subjects in the
“Word-condition” saw a word coupled with a neutral image (a rectan-
gle), while subjects in the “Picture-condition” saw an image coupled
with neutral text (a row of five X’s).172  In other cases, the researchers
projected an image and a word with inconsistent connotations—for
instance, an image of a rabbit (positive) with the word “SNAKE”
(negative).173  For subjects in the “Picture-condition,” average reac-
tion times did not meaningfully differ between the neutral-text situa-
tions and the inconsistent-connotation situations.174  However,
subjects in the “Word-condition” responded much more slowly when
they saw an inconsistent picture-word combination than when they
saw a neutral image.175  From these findings, the researchers con-
cluded that the emotional force of the images overpowered subjects’
attempts to associate positive or negative emotions with the words.176
On the other hand, the emotional power of the words did not interfere
with participants’ ability to place the images in the “positive” or “neg-
ative” category.177  Once again, cognitive neuroscience sheds light on
168. Id.
169. Id. at 492.
170. Jan De Houwer & Dirk Hermans, Differences in the Affective Processing of Words and
Pictures, 8 COGNITION & EMOTION 1, 4–5 (1994).
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 4–5.
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Houwer & Hermans, supra note 170, at 9 (“The present results demonstrate that, com- R
pared to words, pictures have privileged access to affective information.  Incongruent pictures
interfered with the affective categorization of words, whereas the affective categorization of pic-
tures was not influenced by the presence of a word.”).
177. Id. at 7.
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these results.  Ralph Adolphs and Daniel Tranel have discovered that
damage to the amygdala, a portion of the brain that helps “process[ ]
socially and emotionally relevant information,”178 affects people’s per-
ceptions of pictures.179  The links between the image- and emotion-
processing sections of the brain aid in explaining why graphics pro-
duce more intense emotional responses than words do.180
As these studies reveal, images can stimulate powerful emotional
reactions, but pictures can also enhance viewers’ retention of impor-
tant facts.  Cognitive psychologist Allan Paivio has distinguished be-
tween two “modes of symbolic representation” (or “coding systems”)
that people use to collate information about the world.181  One mode
is imagery; the other consists of “verbal processes.”182  In his studies
of symbolic representation, Paivio found some support for the “coding
redundancy hypothesis,” which suggests that one’s memory of infor-
mation improves when one stores the information in both nonverbal
(pictorial) and verbal (textual) form.183
The work of educational psychologist Richard E. Mayer offers fur-
ther support for this hypothesis.184  Mayer and his colleagues
presented students with information about how pumps and brakes
work.185  Some of the students listened to narration accompanied by
animation, while other students listened to the narration without any
corresponding graphics.186  In another set of experiments, Mayer and
his collaborators provided students with information about how
pumps, brakes, or generators work or how lightning is produced.187
Some students learned this information by reading illustrated texts,
while other students read texts without pictures.188  In both sets of
178. Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Tranel, Preferences for Visual Stimuli Following Amygdala
Damage, 11 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 610, 610 (1999).
179. Id. at 611–12.
180. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 36, at 8 (“The same areas of the brain that process R
visual perceptions are also responsible for mental imagery, and these are connected to the amyg-
dala and other areas of the brain critical for emotion.  And, because visual information acquires
emotional valence before that information ever gets to the cortex, the whole picture passes along
its emotional colors even as we begin to decode its parts.” (footnotes omitted)).
181. ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES 8 (1979); see also ALLAN PAIVIO,
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH 53 (1990).
182. PAIVIO, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS, supra note 181, at 53 (“The most general assump- R
tion in dual coding theory is that there are two classes of phenomena handled cognitively by
separate subsystems, one specialized for the representation and processing of information con-
cerning nonverbal objects and events, the other specialized for dealing with language.”).
183. Id. at 181, 207–08, 220.
184. MAYER, supra note 42, at 63–80. R
185. Id. at 72.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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studies, students took a “retention test” and a “transfer test” after be-
ing exposed to the relevant information.189  The retention test re-
quired subjects to recall information that they had learned, while the
transfer test required students to complete problem-solving exercises
(with scoring based on the number of creative responses that each
student offered).190  After conducting these experiments, Mayer and
his fellow researchers concluded that “adding pictures to words
tended to improve student performance on retention tests.”191  Simi-
larly, the researchers found that “students who learned with words
and pictures generated considerably more creative answers to
problems than did students who learned with words alone.”192  As
Mayer stated, “[The] results support the thesis that a deeper kind of
learning occurs when learners are able to integrate pictorial and ver-
bal representations of the same message.”193
This discussion of image processing hints at both the dangers and
the benefits of pictorial disclosures.  Images may manipulatively un-
dermine consumers’ rational faculties, just as the D.C. Circuit omi-
nously warned in R.J. Reynolds.194  But images can also improve
recollection of facts.  Moreover, courts may have difficulty disaggre-
gating an image’s effects, especially because these effects can interact
with one another: The visceral impact of an emotional image might
enhance viewers’ ability to remember facts associated with that image.
The judicial distinction between facts and emotions, already suspect
when applied to text disclosures, becomes even blurrier when images
come into play.
IV. A DOCTRINAL RECOMMENDATION
As Robert Post has written, protections for commercial speech
guard against specific type of harm, and they instantiate a specific
view of the consuming public.195  Outside of the commercial-speech
realm, the First Amendment typically safeguards “those forms of com-
munication that are deemed necessary to ensure that a democratic
state remains responsive to the views of its citizens.”196  These protec-
tions, which ensure that people are able to contribute to “public dis-
189. Id.
190. MAYER, supra note 42, at 63–80. R
191. Id. at 73.
192. Id. at 76.
193. Id. at 79.
194. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
195. Post, supra note 24, at 4. R
196. Id.
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course,” are “speaker oriented,” focused on enabling individuals to
participate in collective discussion.197
When the First Amendment operates to check government prohibi-
tions of commercial speech, the amendment operates differently be-
cause it protects individuals as consumers—as homo economicus,
“independent and rational” beings—rather than as political actors.198
Commercial speech is valuable because it provides consumers with in-
formation that is useful to them as they make economic choices.199
Commercial-speech safeguards are “sharply audience oriented” be-
cause they place high value on the information that is conveyed to
consumers, rather than on the ability of corporations to contribute to
public discourse or political debate.200
When the government attempts to compel commercial speech, the
First Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, strikes a bal-
ance between the harm of requiring a corporation to subsidize a gov-
ernment message and the benefit of giving consumers access to
information that might shape economic choices.201 Zauderer is the
Court’s effort to explain how this balance operates.  The Zauderer
Court began by distinguishing between “disclosure requirements” and
“outright prohibitions on speech”—a distinction, the Court acknowl-
edged, that had little relevance outside of the commercial-speech con-
text.202  But in the realm of commercial speech, “disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests
than do flat prohibitions on speech.”203  Because corporations’ “con-
stitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in [their] advertising is minimal,” the Court determined
that disclosure requirements should be subject to less strict scrutiny
than prohibitions on commercial speech.204  Disclosure requirements
197. Id. at 14–15.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id. at 14; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informa-
tional function of advertising.”).
200. Post, supra note 24, at 14–15. R
201. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“This case
contains elements of compulsion and forced subsidization.”), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst.
v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
202. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985) (“We have, to be
sure, held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amend-
ment as prohibitions on speech.  Indeed, in West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, the Court
went so far as to state that ‘involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more
immediate and urgent grounds than silence.’” (citations omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1942))).
203. Id. at 651.
204. Id.
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would survive, the Court said, as long as they were “reasonably re-
lated to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”205
Zauderer’s test has a logic to it.  The Court recognized that corpora-
tions endure some harm when they are required to speak; otherwise,
disclosure mandates would not be subject to any First Amendment
scrutiny at all206—just as “misleading” commercial speech receives no
First Amendment protection.207  Nonetheless, in the typical case, the
harm suffered by corporations is “minimal” and is outweighed by the
government’s interest in providing information to consumers.208  Af-
ter weighing these competing concerns, the Court concluded that a
rational-basis-type test sufficed to protect commercial interests.209
Taking Zauderer at its word, a simple doctrinal test emerges.  When
evaluating a commercial-speech regulation, courts should ask whether
the regulation is a “disclosure requirement” or an “outright prohibi-
tion on speech.”210  If the law bans commercial speech, then Central
Hudson’s intermediate standard of review applies.  If the law requires
commercial speech, then Zauderer’s lower tier of scrutiny applies.
That is all Zauderer says.
Despite this straightforward lesson, lower courts have made a mess
of the Zauderer doctrine.  The primary problem is that courts have
treated aspects of the Zauderer test as prerequisites to invocation of
that test. Zauderer asks courts to assess whether “disclosure require-
ments are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers,”211 but in R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit
flipped around the inquiry.  The court stated that Zauderer review did
not apply because the government had not shown that “there [was] a
self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—danger” of deception in
the absence of the graphic warnings.212  The court should have as-
sessed the regulation’s ability to combat deception as part of the
Zauderer inquiry itself, not when determining whether Zauderer
should apply at all.
The R.J. Reynolds court’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” in-
quiry suffers from the same flaw. Zauderer’s sole reference to this
205. Id.
206. Id. (describing “appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing any partic-
ular factual information in his advertising,” but noting that this interest was “minimal”).
207. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
208. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 650.
211. Id. at 651.
212. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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inquiry came when the Court stated that Ohio’s attorney-conduct reg-
ulation “has taken the form of a requirement that [Zauderer] include
in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information
about the terms under which his services will be available.”213  This
language does not outline a legal test but simply buttresses the Court’s
conclusion that disclosure requirements—many of which mandate the
provision of “purely factual and uncontroversial information”—war-
rant less strict scrutiny than prohibitions on speech.  The “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” language does not outline a legal standard
that must be satisfied before Zauderer review applies.  The phrase
simply describes the Ohio regulation at issue in Zauderer itself.214
I do not intend to dismiss this phrase entirely, and any test based on
Zauderer must account for the Court’s decision to include the “purely
factual and uncontroversial” language in its opinion.  The Court used
213. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
214. Id.  The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in concluding that Zauderer applied to
a facial challenge to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act’s disclosure
regime:
[The] “purely factual and uncontroversial” . . . language appears in Zauderer once and
the context does not suggest that the Court is describing the characteristics that a dis-
closure must possess for a court to apply Zauderer’s rational-basis rule.  That language
instead merely describes the disclosure the Court faced in that specific instance.  This
reading is buttressed by the fact that elsewhere Zauderer refers to a commercial
speaker[’s] disclosing “factual information” and “accurate information.”
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted).  The Sixth Circuit went on to note that a recent Supreme Court decision
validated this reading of Zauderer: “[A] disclosure need not be purely factual and noncontrover-
sial to apply the rational-basis rule . . . .  The Court instead uses the language required factual
information and only an accurate statement when describing the characteristics of a disclosure
that is scrutinized for a rational basis.” Id. at 559–60 n.8 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,
P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010)).  In his dissent in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v.
SEC, Judge Srinivasan may have been alluding to the same point when he noted:
In assessing whether the conflict minerals disclosure squares with the phrase “purely
factual and uncontroversial,” it is important to bear in mind that [the] phrase comes
from a judicial opinion, not a statute.  And the “language of an opinion is not always to
be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.”  Language in a judi-
cial opinion should be “read in context,” taking into account the whole of the court’s
analysis.
800 F.3d 518, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)).  In that case, however, Judge Srinivasan was bound
by D.C. Circuit precedent that treated the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard as a
prerequisite to Zauderer review. See Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“In this case, the criteria triggering the application of Zauderer are either
unchallenged or substantially unchallenged.  The decision requires the disclosures to be of
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ about the good or service being offered.”). But
see Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“If . . . a challenged regulation simply requires a commercial speaker to dis-
close ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information,’ courts will apply a more permissive stan-
dard of review.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)).
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this phrase to point out that disclosure requirements typically seek to
provide information to the consuming public.  That information is
generally valuable only to the extent that it is accurate.  If the infor-
mation misleads consumers, provides them with facts that are irrele-
vant to their purchasing decisions, or conveys contested facts as if they
were undisputed, it may no longer serve a useful economic purpose.
Zauderer’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” language stands for a
proposition that should itself be uncontroversial: Compelled disclo-
sures are worth protecting only if they enhance consumers’ knowl-
edge.215  Building from that principle, factual accuracy should sit at
the center of any doctrinal test that emerges from Zauderer.
This discussion of Zauderer, coupled with the earlier critiques of the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in R.J. Reynolds, suggests a new approach to
compelled commercial-speech cases (or, perhaps, reawakens an old
approach).  When faced with a commercial-speech case, courts should
undertake a four-part inquiry.  First, they should determine whether
the regulation at issue prohibits speech or compels speech.  Disclosure
requirements should be subject to Zauderer review, while bans on
commercial speech warrant Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.
Second, if they decide that Zauderer applies, courts should determine
what information the disclosure provides to consumers, typically with
reference to surveys or other data and with attention to the specific
aspects of the disclosure that trigger reactions from consumers.  Third,
courts should assess whether the information conveyed by the disclo-
sure is accurate.  Fourth, judges should evaluate whether the informa-
tion is relevant to consumers’ purchasing decisions—again, typically
with reference to any available (valid) survey results or other data.
Disclosure requirements that satisfy Steps Three and Four—that re-
sult in the transmission of both accurate and relevant information—
should survive First Amendment review.
A. Distinguishing Prohibitions from Disclosures
Step One of the revised commercial-speech inquiry seems straight-
forward.  Courts must simply determine whether a challenged regula-
tion compels speech (requires corporations to disclose certain
information) or prohibits speech (requires corporations to not disclose
certain information).  Pushing hard on this distinction might reveal,
215. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 537–38 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“To qualify as
‘purely factual and uncontroversial,’ . . . the disclosed information must in fact be ‘factual,’ and it
must also be ‘uncontroversially’ so, in the sense that there could be no ‘disagree[ment] with the
truth of the facts required to be disclosed.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27)).
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however, that it is fuzzier than it first appears.  If tobacco companies
are required to print graphic images on cigarette packs, are these com-
panies implicitly prohibited from using that space for other purposes?
While prohibition and compulsion are often two sides of the same
coin, focusing on the content of the banned (or mandated) speech
helps focus the inquiry.  The FDA’s graphic-image regulation tells to-
bacco companies what they must say but does not prevent them from
saying anything.216  If they would like, cigarette companies can com-
bat the FDA’s campaign by taking out ads that sing tobacco’s praises.
Admittedly, the graphic-warning regulation prevents cigarette retail-
ers from using certain spaces on cigarette packs for these purposes,
but the FDA’s rule does not prevent tobacco companies from saying
anything in particular in the spaces that are available to them for
speech.  This analysis gets at the difference between prohibition and
compulsion, at least as those terms are relevant to First Amendment
analysis.  The crucial question is how the law regulates the content of
speech: Does the regulation require companies to make a specific
statement or does the regulation prevent them from doing so?  Only
regulations that mandate speech should receive Zauderer review.
B. Justifying Interpretive Choices
If a regulation compels speech, Zauderer’s lenient standard of re-
view applies.  To perform Zauderer scrutiny, courts should begin by
asking precisely what information the compelled speech conveys.  This
step of the analysis seeks to focus courts’ attention on aspects of the
doctrinal inquiry that typically escape sustained consideration.  Simply
by interrogating what information they gain from a disclosure, judges
will force themselves to acknowledge that they are engaged in a fun-
damentally interpretive act.  They will have to point to specific aspects
of the disclosure that convey information or incite emotion.  By mak-
ing their interpretive assumptions explicit, courts will enable attorneys
and other judges to challenge those assumptions and propose alterna-
tive understandings of the disclosure.  This step serves a disciplinary
function by forcing courts to articulate the crucial, often contestable,
assumptions that drive compelled commercial-speech decisions.
216. This point draws on the Supreme Court’s analysis of “time, place, and manner” restric-
tions, which regulate the way that speech is conveyed but not the content of that speech. See
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting that “time, place,
and manner” restrictions survive First Amendment review “provided that they are justified with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information” (emphasis added)).
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At first glance, this inquiry might seem to empower judges more
than it constrains them.  Interpretive judgments are, at least to a cer-
tain extent, subjective, and different people might emerge with differ-
ent messages after viewing the same disclosure.  This degree of
flexibility creates opportunities for manipulation.  A judge might offer
an interpretation that preordains the legal outcome she favors; she
might claim that she gleaned deceptive information from a disclosure
simply so that she can strike down that disclosure.  The subjectivity of
some interpretive choices means that they can be difficult to chal-
lenge, which also means that the revised Zauderer test may be ripe for
abuse by politically motivated judges.
But comparing this revised Zauderer inquiry to the test’s current
incarnation reveals that the dangers are not as threatening as they ap-
pear.  Judges already make interpretive choices in compelled commer-
cial-speech cases, as the R.J. Reynolds majority did when it said that
“many of the [FDA’s] images do not convey any warning information
at all.”217  Judges already have tremendous discretion when they make
these choices, in part because the current doctrinal framework does
not force them to articulate and defend their assumptions.  When the
R.J. Reynolds court characterized the FDA’s images as “emotional”
rather than “purely factual,” it exercised a great deal of discretion in
assessing the information that the pictures conveyed; the majority sim-
ply concealed that discretion by engaging in a broad categorization
exercise (fact or emotion?) rather than a specific interpretive one.  By
bringing the interpretive act to the surface, the revised Zauderer in-
quiry seeks to subject this act to the constraints and limits that clarity
provides.
Another disciplinary device will operate to limit judicial discretion
at this stage of the inquiry.  Courts should rely on any accessible
(valid) data to determine how consumers will view the challenged dis-
closure.  The R.J. Reynolds court had such data at its fingertips be-
cause the FDA had conducted a study to determine which graphic
images were most effective “in communicating the harms of smoking”
to consumers.218  As the agency explained in its final rule, researchers
used an online study to collect data from eighteen thousand partici-
pants and evaluated the subjects’ responses to thirty-six possible
images (from which the final nine were selected).219  Subjects viewed
the graphic-warning labels (including the images, text, and the 1-800-
217. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
218. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,637 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)).
219. Id.
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QUIT-NOW number), while a control group viewed the text state-
ments without any accompanying imagery.220  Immediately after their
exposure to the labels, viewers were asked questions to assess reac-
tions to (and the subjects’ recall of) the information conveyed by the
warnings.221  The researchers also contacted subjects a week after the
initial exposure to gauge the images’ continuing impact.222
The FDA’s study contained useful information that the D.C. Circuit
might have invoked in assessing how consumers would interpret the
graphic images.  The agency asked subjects to “tell us how much you
agree or disagree with the following statement: If I have smoked a
pack of cigarettes a day for more than 20 years, there is little health
benefit to me quitting smoking.”223  Another section asked respon-
dents to “tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Many people who smoke live to a ripe old age, so smoking
is not all that bad for me.”224  As Christine Jolls has noted, people
with “factually accurate risk perceptions” would likely regard these
statements as incorrect:225  Smoking has negative health effects,226 and
quitting (even after smoking for an extended period) frequently yields
significant health benefits.227  The FDA’s study found that subjects
who saw certain graphic-image warnings emerged with a better under-
standing of smoking’s risks than viewers who saw text-only warn-
ings.228  The FDA also asked respondents to estimate their risks of
cancer, fatal lung disease, heart disease, and stroke, and to provide
general assessments of their health (for instance, “Do you think your
smoking has affected your health?”; “How concerned are you that
your smoking has affected your health?”).229  Subjects’ answers sug-
gested that exposure to certain of the images improved viewers’ risk
perceptions.230  Given the FDA’s study, the D.C. Circuit had a readily
available source on which to draw in assessing consumers’ responses
220. Id. at 36,638.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Jolls, supra note 160, at 62. R
224. Id.
225. Id. at 63–64.
226. Prabhat Jha et al., 21st-Century Hazards of Smoking and Benefits of Cessation in the
United States, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341, 343 (2013).
227. Id. at 345.
228. Jolls, supra note 160, at 64.  Not all of the images produced less agreement with the stated R
assertions; respondents who viewed certain images expressed higher rates of agreement. Id.  But
as Jolls concluded, “Overall, the estimates . . . provide support for the conclusion that factual
misperceptions tend to be (though they are not inevitably) lower with [the FDA’s graphic-image]
warning[s] than with a text-only alternative.” Id.
229. Id. at 62.
230. Id. at 64–68.
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to the graphic-image warnings.  Based on the data, the court’s assump-
tion—that “many of the images do not convey any warning informa-
tion at all”231—moves from a contestable premise to an implausible
one, a speculative assessment contradicted by the thorough research
assembled by the FDA.
When they grapple with the constitutionality of disclosure require-
ments, judges should rely on valid data to guide interpretive choices.
If courts embark down this path, agencies should take the cue by gath-
ering and presenting the types of data to which courts are receptive.
By drawing on consumers’ actual reactions to contested disclosures,
courts can evaluate the disclosures’ effects with a reasonable degree of
accuracy and avoid giving in to judges’ initial, untested interpretive
impulses.
C. Assessing Accuracy
After offering reasoned explanations for their interpretive choices,
judges should move on to Step Three of the revised Zauderer inquiry:
Is the information accurate?  The disputed nature of some facts means
that this inquiry will not always be clear-cut.  Even seemingly innocu-
ous factual statements can generate debate.  (Is a disclosure really ac-
curate if it states that “cigarettes cause cancer” when they do not
invariably do so?  Should the statement say instead that “cigarettes
sometimes cause cancer”?)  But while the accuracy inquiry may pose
difficulties at the margins, it also excludes a broad swath of inaccurate
or misleading material.232  Imagine that consumers begin to drastically
overestimate their risk of lung cancer after viewing the FDA’s graphic
images.  These viewers might overestimate to such an extent that they
now have a less accurate understanding of smoking’s health effects
than they did before seeing the pictures.  In this case, the images con-
vey inaccurate information, and they should not be permitted under
the First Amendment.
An initial question arises: How should judges, lacking expertise in
the areas that compelled disclosures address, determine whether a
piece of information is accurate?  Courts may confront competing ex-
pert testimony, and they may come across sharply disputed factual is-
231. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in
part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
232. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dis-
senting) (noting that “there could well be difficult questions of application [with respect to the
‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ test] at the margins,” but that such questions are “not en-
tirely uncommon in the area of the First Amendment, in which standards at times have been
characterized as ‘elusive’ in their application” (quoting Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760
F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014))).
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sues.  The way out of these difficulties is to think of the accuracy
prong as an evidentiary requirement, not as a scientific showdown.
While judges may need to wade into technical debates at this stage of
the inquiry, agencies bear the primary responsibility for presenting ev-
idence that proves the truth of the information contained in any com-
pelled disclosure.  If the agency provides such evidence, the regulation
satisfies the accuracy prong; if the agency does not offer such evi-
dence, the regulation should not survive First Amendment review.
Thinking of the accuracy analysis as an evidentiary requirement im-
ports a dose of deference into the doctrine because judges will have to
rely on agencies to showcase evidence that confirms the relevant facts.
Courts will also have access to countervailing evidence presented by
opposing parties, and judges will always, at the end of the day, have to
undertake an independent analysis of the proof presented by both
sides—just as happens every time a court confronts a contested factual
issue about which the judge has no expertise.
In performing the accuracy analysis, courts should remain mindful
of the close connection between Steps Two and Three of the revised
Zauderer inquiry.  Judges can assess the accuracy of information only
if they know the nature of the information they are evaluating.  If
viewers interpret the phrase “cigarettes cause cancer” to mean that
cigarettes always cause cancer, then the phrase does not convey accu-
rate information; if viewers interpret the phrase to mean that ciga-
rettes can cause cancer, then the phrase is accurate.  Determining the
disclosure’s content is a necessary prerequisite to assessing accuracy.
Courts should also recognize that the accuracy prong does not re-
quire them to deal in binaries.  Some statements are demonstrably
false while others are irrefutably true, but there are many shades of
gray in between.  “Cigarettes cause cancer” is more accurate than
“cigarettes never cause cancer,” but “cigarettes can cause cancer”
might be more accurate—at least more precisely accurate—than both.
Courts must recognize that “accurate” need not mean scientifically
validated; it might simply mean that consumers who view the disclo-
sure emerge with a more accurate understanding than they began
with.  Assume that smokers are twenty-five times more likely than
nonsmokers to receive a diagnosis of lung cancer,233 but that consum-
ers think smokers are only five times as likely as non-smokers to get
lung cancer.  After seeing the FDA’s graphic images, viewers’ esti-
mates improve.  Now consumers think that smokers are ten times as
233. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 161 (2014).
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likely as non-smokers to receive the diagnosis.  The images have not
provided “accurate” information because they have not conveyed the
correct risk level, but the images have enabled viewers to develop
more accurate beliefs than those viewers held before.  If a disclosure
increases the accuracy of consumers’ perceptions, then that disclosure
satisfies Step Three, even if viewers’ knowledge does not completely
align with scientific learning on the subject.
Relatedly, accuracy is not synonymous with correctness.  A state-
ment that is literally true can still be deceptive, and courts should use
Step Three to strike down technically accurate disclosures that none-
theless mislead consumers.  Think of a bar graph that manipulates the
scale so that viewers overestimate the extent to which smoking-related
deaths have increased over time.  Or consider a statistic, based on a
too-small sample size, that misleads consumers about the average life
expectancies of smokers versus nonsmokers.  Once again, courts can
easily spot deceptive disclosures by considering Step Two in tandem
with Step Three.  The key move is to look at the information that
consumers actually receive from the disclosure.  Even if images or text
are, strictly speaking, accurate, do consumers come away with incor-
rect impressions?  If so, the disclosure should not survive Step Three
of the revised Zauderer review.234
Difficult questions might arise at this stage if a disclosure enhances
consumers’ factual perceptions on some scales but worsens viewers’
perceptions on others.  Consumers who see a particular image might
emerge with an improved understanding of their risk of lung cancer
but also come away with a decreased understanding of their risk of
heart disease.  In these cases, courts will have to balance the conflict-
ing signals and determine whether the inaccurate components of the
warning outweigh the accurate elements.  Judges should assess the
magnitude of consumers’ improved judgments as compared to the
magnitude of any decreases in accurate understandings, and courts
should consider the importance of the issues on which consumers
demonstrate increased and decreased knowledge.  An image that con-
veys misinformation about the risk of bad breath is likely less worri-
some than an image that conveys misinformation about the risk of
cancer.  As this example illustrates, an accuracy analysis is not a true/
false quiz; courts will have to make knotty, contestable judgments
about knotty, contestable facts.  But the benefits of an accuracy analy-
sis remain clear: Step Three offers courts a way to protect consumers
234. See MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 580
(Am. Publ’g Co. 1897) (“Often, the surest way to convey misinformation is to tell the strict
truth.”).
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against one of the core dangers of compelled commercial speech—the
risk that viewers will base their economic decisions on wrong
information.
D. Determining Relevance
If a disclosure does not convey accurate information, it should not
survive Zauderer review.  If a regulation passes the accuracy analysis,
courts should move on to the final question: Does the disclosure con-
vey information that is relevant to consumers’ economic choices?
Data gathered by agencies can—and should—play a role at this stage
of the analysis.  Agencies should undertake surveys and gather data to
assess whether the information contained in a proposed disclosure will
influence consumers’ purchasing decisions, and courts should refer to
these data in assessing the information’s relevance.  The doctrinal in-
quiry should center on whether the typical consumer would find the
information relevant to her economic decision making, so judges
should avoid the temptation to determine whether they find the infor-
mation relevant.  Relying on agency-gathered (or other publicly acces-
sible) data will further this goal.
This prong of the revised Zauderer inquiry seeks to prevent the gov-
ernment from using mental heuristics that might encourage consumers
to associate negative emotions with certain products.235  Consider a
requirement that tobacco companies print images of spiders on ciga-
rette packs.  A regulator might hope that these images will cause view-
ers to associate negative, fearful, or disgusted emotions with
cigarettes.  However, because consumers presumably would not find
that the spider image provides relevant information, the disclosure
should fail under Step Four.
How relevant is relevant enough?  Imagine that one-third of con-
sumers say a piece of information will influence their economic deci-
sions, one-third say it will have no impact, and one-third say they are
not sure.  This hypothetical piece of information should satisfy the rel-
evance inquiry.  Step Four should not pose a high bar to most disclo-
sure regimes, and even de minimis relevance should suffice to pass the
test.  If a small minority of consumers finds the information relevant,
then the disclosure offers them substantial benefits, while the remain-
ing consumers suffer little harm (assuming that the information is ac-
curate) because they can go about their purchasing decisions and
disregard the material that they find irrelevant.  Although corpora-
tions might resist disclosing information that most consumers will find
235. See Tushnet, supra note 52, at 2411. R
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irrelevant, Zauderer counsels that consumers, not corporations,
should remain at the center of the compelled commercial-speech anal-
ysis.  Assuming that some consumers find the information significant
in shaping their economic choices, the disclosure should survive.
While regulators need not clear a high hurdle to satisfy the rele-
vance inquiry, this inquiry remains a central component of the revised
Zauderer test.  The government should not have free rein to impose
any disclosure requirement on regulated entities simply because the
disclosure conveys accurate information: A certain subset (perhaps a
small subset) of accurate disclosures will shape people’s preferences in
illegitimate ways.  The relevance prong acts as a failsafe protection
against this sort of manipulation by shielding consumers from the dan-
gers illustrated by the spiders-on-cigarette-packs example.  While the
government is unlikely to require a disclosure that reveals entirely ir-
relevant information, doctrinal completeness requires that the test
guard against the possibility of such a requirement.  Not every accu-
rate disclosure should survive.
While scholars236 and judges237 generally support a doctrinal em-
phasis on accuracy, they have been hesitant to import a relevance in-
quiry into the analysis.  Rebecca Tushnet, relying on research
performed by Douglas Kysar, offers a forceful critique:
[C]onsumers’ preferences are not stable and depend on what gets
disclosed to them.  Disclosure at the point of purchase makes condi-
tions of production (whether a product was made with child or slave
labor, whether it contains genetically modified organisms, and so
on) more salient and removes “moral wiggle room.”  As a result, we
face a choice between a vision of a marketplace in which “consum-
ers satisfy their personal interests unimpeded by concern for the
welfare of others” and one in which consumers behave in accor-
dance with more “altruistic ideals” held by the norm entrepreneurs
who focus on particular conditions of production.  These ideals may
involve animal welfare, union labor, foreign production, or some-
thing else.  Kysar concludes that neither set of behaviors reveals
“true” preferences.  Rather, context and the ability to see how one’s
236. See Corbin, supra note 24, at 1295 (“[C]ompelled speech that is itself false or misleading R
distorts the discourse.”); Goodman, supra note 52, at 525 (“Because the principal purpose of R
commercial speech protection is to safeguard the consumer’s interests in accurate information, it
naturally follows that inaccurate information would fall outside the zone of protection.”);
Tushnet, supra note 52, at 2432 (“Ultimately, I can’t see why the government can’t express its R
preferences, even in emotional terms, as long as it isn’t deceptive about those preferences.”).
237. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 538 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“But even if the disclo-
sure qualifies as ‘purely factual,’ it would still fall outside of Zauderer review if the accuracy of
the particular information disclosed were subject to dispute.”).
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choices affect others determine behavior, meaning that the choice
of a disclosure regime is fundamentally normative.238
Disclosures influence preferences, which in turn influence the infor-
mation that consumers desire to have disclosed.239  Simply asking peo-
ple whether they find a particular piece of information relevant may
shape their understanding of that information’s relevance.  Because
disclosures and preferences loop back on one another, Tushnet con-
tends, asking consumers to assess a disclosure’s relevance is an exer-
cise in futility.
I concede Tushnet’s point about the normativity of preferences, but
I do not share the conclusion she draws from it.  First, the state’s (or
the market’s) ability to mold people’s preferences is not infinite.  A
consumer who views the FDA’s graphic images might change her
views about the relevance of the information that the images convey.
But a consumer who sees a picture of a spider on a cigarette pack is
unlikely to find the spider an illuminating intervention in the debate
over smoking.  The relevance inquiry seeks to protect against these
sort of extreme regulations, not to force courts to make close calls
about the intersection between information disclosures and consumer
preferences.
To put the point simply: Tushnet gives up too much ground.  She
begins with the premise that preferences are (at least in many cases)
normative.  I accept this foundation.  But she then concludes that
preferences should have no role in the doctrinal inquiry.  That is a
bridge too far.  Revealed preferences are not useless, as I hope
Tushnet would concede; they reveal people’s understandings of their
own values at a given point in time, even if those understandings re-
flect consumers’ views in incomplete and contingent ways.  When the
state mandates commercial speech, it makes an assumption about the
public’s present preferences and makes a judgment about what those
preferences should be.  This point hints at the crucial difference be-
tween Tushnet’s approach and my own.  Tushnet asks whether peo-
ple’s preferences are normative, and when she answers affirmatively,
her inquiry ends.  I think that compelled commercial-speech doctrine
needs to go a step further: Given the normativity of people’s prefer-
ences, who should make decisions about the relevance of contested
information?  Should agencies be permitted to promulgate any regula-
tion that they regard as relevant, even if the FDA suddenly starts to
238. Tushnet, supra note 52, at 2428–29 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Douglas A. Kysar, Pref- R
erences for Process: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118
HARV. L. REV. 525, 628–32 (2004)).
239. Id.
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put spiders on cigarette packs or snakes on sugary foods?  Should
courts give the FDA unlimited authority to shape people’s preferences
in potentially insidious ways?
Instead of offering regulators near-unlimited discretion, I propose
that agencies ask people about their views on relevance and that
courts rely on the information gathered by agencies in applying the
revised Zauderer test.  The data compiled by agencies may not give
courts a complete understanding of consumers’ views, but revealed
preferences offer a kind of insight that judges could not glean simply
by allowing the state to impose regulations as it sees fit. Zauderer
counsels that consumers should drive the doctrinal analysis, and rely-
ing on their preferences—unstable as they may be—offers an impor-
tant check on agencies’ power to manipulate consumers’ views.
E. Evaluating the FDA’s Graphic Images
The final question: Would the FDA’s graphic images survive the re-
vised Zauderer inquiry?  I suspect that eight of the nine images would
pass the test, while the remaining picture would likely fail.
To evaluate the FDA’s graphic-warning regulation, courts should
begin by asking whether the regulation compels or prohibits speech.
Because the regulation requires tobacco companies to say something,
it mandates speech, so Zauderer scrutiny applies.
Second, courts must explain precisely what information the images
convey.  While the R.J. Reynolds dissenter’s interpretation of the
images is not the only valid one, her discussion of one of the images
demonstrates how courts should go about Step Two: “The image ac-
companying the textual warning ‘Cigarettes are addictive’ depicts a
man smoking through a tracheotomy opening in his throat.  Viewed
with the accompanying text, this image conveys the tenacity of nico-
tine addiction:  even after undergoing surgery for cancer, one might be
unable to abstain from smoking.”240  Here is how I might urge a court
to advance its interpretation of one of the other images:
One picture depicts a small child peering at a waft of smoke.  The
fearful look in the child’s eyes hints at the ways in which second-
hand smoke can affect those who are exposed to it—including those
who are very vulnerable, such as infants in a smoker’s care.  The
presence of an adult’s face in the upper right-hand corner evokes
the ways in which children depend on their caretakers, as well as the
ways in which caretakers (as a result of smoking’s externalities) can
240. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1231–32 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d
18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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harm those under their protection.  The cloud of smoke moving di-
rectly towards the child’s face adds an eerie sense of omen to the
picture.  If the image itself were not enough, the words make the
message explicit: “WARNING: TOBACCO SMOKE CAN HARM
YOUR CHILDREN.”
These passages demonstrate that acts of interpretation need not fade
into subjective attempts at meaning making.  Both passages point to
specific aspects of the images that drive the interpretive judgments
(“the accompanying text,” “an adult’s face in the upper-right hand
corner”).  Judges might supplement these sorts of interpretive analy-
ses with references to the administrative record.  The FDA’s surveys
revealed that the graphic images conveyed information about smok-
ing’s risks to consumers by enhancing viewers’ understandings of the
benefits of quitting and the health risks of continued tobacco use.241
By pointing to specific features of the images and relying on valid
data, courts can ensure that interpretation, despite its status as a
deeply personal act, does not become an unreasonable (or unrea-
soned) one.
After advancing interpretations of the contested disclosures, courts
should ask whether the disclosed information is accurate.  The FDA’s
data provides sufficient information to conclude that, in this case, the
images convey accurate information to consumers.  Subjects who
viewed the pictures walked away with an improved sense of the health
effects of cigarette smoking, and no party in R.J. Reynolds presented
evidence that the accuracy of consumers’ understandings declined in
any substantial or meaningful way.242  The regulation satisfies Step
Three of the revised Zauderer inquiry.
Finally, courts should conclude by assessing the disclosure’s rele-
vance to consumers.  The FDA’s study does not shed much light on
whether the graphic images contain relevant information.  The less-
than-illuminating nature of the FDA’s data is not surprising because
most courts have not emphasized relevance in applying Zauderer or
assessing compelled disclosures.  But if courts were to refocus the
Zauderer test on relevance, agencies would have immediate and pow-
erful incentives to gather information about a disclosure’s relevance to
the typical consumer.  Without survey results or other data, any con-
clusions on relevance will necessarily be speculative, but my suspicion
is that the FDA’s images would satisfy the relevance prong of the re-
vised Zauderer inquiry.  The Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
241. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,649–70 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)); NONNEMAKER ET AL., supra
note 51, at 3-2 to 3-7. R
242. See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. R
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tion have found that nearly seventy percent of smokers would like to
quit;243 had these people possessed an accurate understanding of
smoking’s health impact when they started, they might have avoided
purchasing their first pack, and had they gained an accurate under-
standing of smoking’s health impact later on, they might have been
able to quit.  Especially because of the severity of some of smoking’s
health consequences, information about tobacco’s risks is likely rele-
vant to smokers’ purchasing decisions.  Given that the relevance
prong should not pose a high bar to disclosure regimes, most of the
FDA’s graphic images should satisfy this stage of the test.
The revised Zauderer inquiry should not act as a rubber stamp, and
I suspect that some proposed regulations would fail under this stan-
dard.  One of the FDA’s graphic images, for example, seems less in-
formative than the others.  It depicts a man wearing a T-shirt that
reads “I QUIT.”244  I am not sure what information this image reveals
to consumers, and to the extent it does convey information, I am not
sure consumers will see that material as relevant to their purchasing
decisions.  The image might survive Zauderer scrutiny only because of
the accompanying text, which reads, “Quitting smoking now greatly
reduces serious risks to your health.”245  But I am not sure how the
image relates to that statement or whether it advances the caption’s
message in any way.  Absent more data about how viewers interpret
the image and about its relevance to their decisions, I am skeptical
that this picture would survive the revised Zauderer inquiry.
The updated Zauderer test has clear benefits when used to analyze
the FDA’s graphic images, but its advantages are not limited to this
context: The inquiry highlights particular factors—accuracy and rele-
vance prime among them—that courts should emphasize when assess-
ing any disclosure, whether presented in textual, pictorial, or some
other form.  The reason the test applies across so many types of disclo-
sures is that it refocuses attention on the concrete benefits that any
disclosure should offer: accurate information that consumers will use
in making economic choices.  By bringing their interpretive assump-
tions to the surface, courts will open those assumptions to reasoned
analysis and critique.  By ensuring that disclosures convey accurate
and relevant information, courts will protect consumers’ interests in
having sound facts on which to base their purchasing decisions.  Col-
lectively, these changes will put compelled commercial-speech doc-
243. Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts (last updated Mar. 29, 2017).
244. See Jolls, supra note 160, at 61 fig. 2. R
245. Id.
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trine on a solid foundation by accounting for the values that this
doctrine is supposed to protect.
V. CONCLUSION
In developing proposals to reform compelled commercial-speech
doctrine, some scholars, including Goodman and Corbin, have sought
to revise the categories that courts use to classify compelled disclo-
sures.  Does this disclosure rely on a cognitive heuristic?  Does that
disclosure convey controversial information?  The categories that
scholars have devised tend to replicate, rather than eliminate, the
problems that current doctrinal categorization schemes (fact or emo-
tion?) create.  Other scholars, including Tushnet, have abandoned the
project altogether by suggesting that non-misleading emotional ap-
peals are presumptively permissible under the First Amendment.  But
this approach is too extreme because it permits the government to
require disclosures that consumers will not find useful.
The key flaw in these proposals is their emphasis on reform.  Upon
recognizing that the current doctrinal categories are not working,
scholars rush forward to develop new ones (or to abandon the effort
at categorization writ large).  The proposed solutions are not only un-
satisfying; they are also untethered to the values that compelled com-
mercial-speech doctrine, according to Zauderer, was designed to
protect.  My four-part test builds on the tradition of scholars like
Goodman, Corbin, and Tushnet by seeking to rationalize the founda-
tion of compelled commercial-speech doctrine.  Rather than branch-
ing out in new directions, however, I see a simple solution in returning
to Zauderer’s roots. Zauderer outlined a doctrinal formula that is ad-
ministrable and that tracks the values that courts seem to care about
when assessing compelled disclosures.  Subsequent developments, es-
pecially caselaw from the lower courts, have obscured this formula by
ignoring the nature of interpretation and by relying on a false distinc-
tion between facts and emotions.  The best solution is to revert to
Zauderer itself—to focus on its distinction between compulsion and
prohibition, to recognize its emphasis on accuracy, and to place con-
sumers at the core of the doctrinal analysis.  This straightforward
methodology cuts through the recent caselaw and returns the doctrine
to a rational footing, all while staying true to the foundational Su-
preme Court precedent in this area.  By focusing on the values that
animate compelled commercial-speech doctrine, this proposal seeks to
create a comprehensible body of law that remains attuned to the basic
(but often neglected) benefit of mandatory disclosures: the informa-
tion that these disclosures convey to consumers.
